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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

KNOWLEDGE OR BELIEF AS A PREREQUISITE TO
CONDONATION IN THE LAW OF DIVORCE
By F. EUGENE READER*
an earlier article' the writer considered the question of what
constitutes the condonation of a marital offense. It was there
concluded that though the courts consistently speak of condonation
as being synonymous with "forgiveness," in fact the presence or
absence of forgiveness, in the ordinary or lay sense of the word,
is not at all determinative of whether a marital offense has been
condoned. Rather, it was found, the doctrine of condonation
is based upon the legal principle that once a spouse has committed
an offense recognized as a ground for divorce the injured spouse
may pursue either of two courses. He may treat the marriage
as thereby terminated de facto and, by comporting himself conformably with its termination through refraining from marital
cohabitation, may preserve the right to have it terminated de jure
by a decree. Or, he may elect to treat the marriage as still
existent, which he does by continuing marital intercourse, in
which case he waives or foregoes his right to obtain a divorce.
Voluntary sexual intercourse, subsequent to a marital offense, is
then what condones that offense. The doctrine has its foundation
in a precept, based on an ethical dictate and a sense of fair play,
that society can not approve of the continuation of the basic incident of marriage coupled with the preservation of a power legally
to terminate that relationship at will.
An obvious qualification of the doctrine is that there can
be no such election unless the injured spouse is aware of the
fact that the marital breach has been committed. One can not be
said to have made a choice, or to have waived a right, when he
was ignorant of the existence of the facts which gave him an alternative course of action. There is therefore an oft-stated rule,
expressed in the statutes 2 and decisions alike, that a knowledge of
the commission of adultery " is a condition precedent to the conN

*A. B., 1928, The College of Wooster; L.L.B., 1931, University of
Pennsylvania. Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law. Member of
Pennsylvania Bar. Contributor to legal periodicals.
'Reader, The Meaning of Condonation in the Law of Divorce (1936)
L. Rev. 92, (1936) 2 Cur. Leg. Th. 499.
40 Dickinson
2
For example, the Pennsylvania statute provides that it shall be a
defense to a suit for divorce if the libellant "has admitted the respondent

KNOWLEDGE OR BELIEF IN CONDONATION

donation of it. Though there can be no question of the propriety
of this rule in the abstract, its concrete application to particular
factual situations is not so simple, and the language of the courts
tends to confuse rather than clarify the real issue.
There can be no doubt that where one spouse is wholly ignorant
of the commission of adultery by the other spouse, as where he
has received no information relating thereto and has observed no
circumstances indicative thereof, marital cohabitation can not
constitute a condonation of the adultery.4 It is where he has
some information, of some sort, or is aware of incriminating
c:rcunistances, that the question arises as to whether he should
be charged with having chosen to continue the marriage and to
forego the remedy to which the adultery entitled him. Suppose
the wife's absence on numerous occasions arouses the husband's
suspicions, or an anonymous letter informs him that she is unfaithful, or he is told of her adultery by a claimed witness
thereto, or she confesses her transgression? In any or all of these
cases is the husband put in the position that his subsequent marital
cohabitation will preclude the possibility of his thereafter divorcing
her for an adultery which she in fact committed?
The test for the determination of this question is said to be
that he must have had "knowledge," ' "full knowledge," 6 "reasonable knowledge," 7 "such knowledge as will satisfy a prudent
man," "probable knowledge,"" etc., of the adulterous act. Is such
into conjugal society or embraces after he or she knew of the criminal
fact." Act of May 2, 1929, Pamphlet Laws (1929), p. 1237, sec. 52, 23
Purd. St., sect. 52. See 2 Vernier, American Family Laws 79, for a resume
of the
statutes.
3
Though the defense of condonation applies to various grounds for
divorce, the requirement of knowledge of the offense will present a problem
only in the case of such grounds as adultery, where the injured spouse may
cohabit in ignorance of the fact of its commission; for in other grounds for
divorce, such as cruelty or desertion, the offense operates or is inflicted
directly upon the person of the injured spouse. Burns v. Burns, (1877) 60
Ind. 259, 260.
4Clark v. Clark, (1867) 97 Mass. 331; Van Wickle v. Van Wickle, (N.J.
App. 245; cf.
Ch. 1919) 108 Atl. 761; Phillips v. Phillips, (1878) 1 Ill.
Wilson v. Wilson, (1888) 16 R. I. 122, 13 AtI. 102.
5See the cases quoted infra, text at footnotes 25 to 27, and the discussion thereof.
'3Bramwell v. Bramwell, (1831) 3 Hagg. Ecc. 618, 630; Johnson v.
Johnson, (1834) 4 Paige (N.Y.) 460; Home v. Home, (1922) 141 'id.
123, 118 Ati. 122, 123; Beeler v. Beeler, (1898) 19 Ky. L. R. 1936, 44 S.W.
136, 7137; Odom v. Odom, (1867) 36 Ga. 286, 319.
Graham v. Graham, (1892) 50 N. J. Eq. 701, 25 Atl. 358, 365; Marsh
v. Marsh, (1861) 13 N. J. Eq. 281, 282.
8Ellis v. Ellis, (N.J. 1887) 9 At. 884, 887; Diggs v. Diggs, (1919)
187 App. Div. 859, 175 N. Y. S.791, 792.
-Connelly v. Connelly, (1903) 98 Mo. App. 95, 71 S.W. 1111, 1113; see
2 Bishop, Marriage and Divorce, 6th ed., sec. 40, p. 33.
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a test practicable? It is not necessary to consult a dictionary to
realize that the noun "knowledge," or the verb "to know," has
many senses and uses, and that little can be accomplished towards
giving the word a definitive content by adding qualifying adjectives, which themselves have a broad content. This connotative
aspect does not necessarily mean that the term "knowledge" must
be dispensed with as an element of the rule, for though it has a
variety of senses and uses, it has a sufficiently generally understood
pivotal meaning to give some content to the underlying principle.
We can safely assume that the word conveys to everyone, at the
least, the idea that the person having knowledge of an act has
some information or indication that the act occurred. In this
narrow sense it merely negatives total ignorance of the act in
question. To some the term may suggest much more. A danger
is that there will be a mechanical application of the term, according
to some particular suggestion of the word, without regard to the
underlying policy of the doctrine of condonation. If the word
"knowledge" is retained as descriptive of a mental state that is a
prerequisite of condonation, extreme care must be used in each
instance to give it a content and meaning that will assure its
application producing a result in keeping with the underlying
notion of fair play that gives breath to the doctrine. A particular
case must be brought within or without the term, not because the
case has some facts identical with another case which was held to
be within the term, or because the facts fall within a particular
connotation of the term, but because the immediate circumstances
are such that the plaintiff's cohabitation could not meet with
approval unless it were treated as a factual reinstatement of the
marriage.
If the term "knowledge," when judicially employed, could be
given some precise denotation, capable of accurate application to
varying factual situations with a consistently just result, and that
precise meaning were made clear in the cases; or, if the term
were used merely as a starting point to an exhaustive examination
of the equities of the particular case, it should perhaps be retained.
But the former is scarcely capable of accomplishment and there
is no particular advantage in the latter. Certainly if some other
test could be employed that would accomplish the former it should
be substituted for "knowledge."
In addition to this "knowledge" phraseology the courts frequently say that there can be no condonation unless the injured
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spouse "believes"' 0 in or "is convinced" of guilt."' It is submitted
that the word "believe" has a quite definite content in its lay
sense. To believe is to put faith or trust in a thing; it is the
mental acceptance of a proposition, statement, or fact as true.
Thus you may have knowledge, in the narrow or some other
sense of that word, of the commission of an act of adultery, and
yet either believe or not believe that the act was committed;
depending upon whether you conclude from the information or
circumstances that the act did take place, or refuse so to conclude
because you do not trust the information or are not convinced from
the suspicious circumstances.
With these observations as to terminology in mind the groundwork is laid for a critical examination of the problem of whether
it is knowledge of adultery (in some broader sense of the word,
as is suggested by the adjectives "full" or "probable") that is
determinative of condonation, or whether it is belief that adultery
has been committed (whether based on slight or much information-upon knowledge in its narrow or broader senses) which is
determinative; or, possibly, whether there must be both knowledge
and belief. This calls for an examination of the actual decisions.
It has been observed, on the one extreme, that where there is
utter ignorance of the adultery there clearly can be no condonation.
The opposite extreme is presented by those cases where the
knowledge is so full and complete that belief in guilt is an
inevitable conclusion and there, clearly, condonation does take
place. Thus, where the injured spouse voluntarily has marital
intercourse after he or she has filed the divorce petition alleging
the prior acts of adultery relied upon,' 2 or after obtaining a
decree nisi,13 or after personally surprising the other in the act
of adultery, 4 or after the guilty spouse has been convicted in a
criminal proceedings of the adultery subsequently charged in the
suit," ' this is a condonation of the adultery. Of the same nature
are those cases where the plaintiff, at the time of the marital
"oSee Ellis v. Ellis, quoted infra, text at footnote 25, and the cases
cited infra, note 32.
"Polson v. Poison, (1895) 140 Ind. 310, 39 N. E. 498, 499; Rogers v.
Rogers, (1916) 67 N. J. Eq. 534, 58 Atl. 822, 824.
12Owsley v. Owsley, (1926) 121 Okla. 259, 249 Pac. 692.

3Sneyd v. Sneyd, [1926] P. 27, 95 L. J. P. 22.
14Toulson v. Toulson, (1901) 93 Md. 754, 50 Atl. 401.

1"Delliber v. Delliber, (1832) 9 Conn. 233; Johnson v. Johnson, (1911)
78 N. J. Eq. 507, 80 Ati. 119. In both of these cases the plaintiff contended

that she did not at that time believe in his guilt, which the court answered
by pointing out that she acquired no further facts of guilt since his conviction, and must have believed he was guilty then if now.
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cohabitation, was in possession of all the information and evidence subsequently relied upon at the trial to prove the adultery.
A simple factual situation typifying these cases is as follows.
Two reputable persons come to the husband and tell him that
they saw his wife commit adultery with another man. Despite this
information the husband has intercourse with his wife. He then
leaves her, starts divorce proceedings, and the sole evidence of
her adultery offered by him is the testimony of the same two
people, who simply testify to what they had told him. That such
conduct is a condonation of the offense the decisions agree.",
The cases of this general nature"7 however, do not add anything to
the problem of whether knowledge or belief is the test, since there
is present in them both knowledge, in almost any sense of the
word, and incontrovertible proof of belief in guilt; for the husband
can not be permitted to say that he disbelieved the very testimony
of the same witnesses upon which he asks the court to pronounce
the wife's guilt, 18 at least in the absence of a showing of collateral
doubt to conviction. 19 As
circumstances causing a change from
2 °
Bordeaux
v.
was said in Bordeaux
"The witnesses who testified to the adulterous act of Dec. 23,
1897, testified that within two or three days after the occurrence
of this act they informed plaintiff, who admits that he received
such information. That he must have believed it is sufficiently
evidenced by the fact that he called the same persons, as his
witnesses upon the trial, to make proof of the allegations of the
complaint."
8
- Bordeaux v. Bordeaux, (1904) 30 Mont. 36, 75 Pac. 524, reversed
on other grounds in (1905) 32 Mont. 159, 80 Pac. 6; Marsh v. Marsh,
(1861) 13 N. J. Eq. 281; Davis v. Davis, (1857) 19 Ill. 334; Stuart v.
Stuart, (1882) 47 Mich. 566, 11 N. W. 388; Todd v. Todd, (N.J. Ch. 1897)
37 Atl. 766; Turnbull v. Turnbull, (1861) 23 Ark. 615; cf. Bridge v.
Bridge, (N.J. Ch. 1915) 93 AtI. 690; Farmer v. Farmer, (1889) 86 Ala.
322, 5 So. 434; Rogers v. Rogers, (1904) 67 N. J. Eq. 534, 58 Atl. 822;
Pepin v. Pepin, (1924) 123 Misc. Rep. 888, 206 N. Y. S. 732.
""Cases where the guilty spouse has confessed his or her adultery to
the other should be included in this class. However, a complicating question
of proof has been raised in these cases and they will hence be discussed
later.
'STurnbnll v. Turnbull (1861) 23 Ark. 615, and Todd v. Todd, (N.J.
Ch. 1897) 37 Atl. 766, are even stronger cases in that in them the husband,
after obtaining the evidentiary information, but before the marital intercourse, acted upon the information in such a way as to leave no doubt that
it and was convinced of her guilt.
he believed
' 9 See Stuart v. Stuart, (1882) 47 Mich. 566, 11 N. W. 388, saying,
"Except that plaintiff has now the testimony of Baum to his own infamy,
there does not appear to be any greater reason for believing in his
wife's guilt now than he had in 1865. ... In short there is nothing in the
evidence which impresses us in the least as a new discovery, and probably
we should never have heard of it but for other quarrels." And see Bordeaux
v. Bordeaux, (1905) 32 Mont. 159, 80 Pac. 6, 9.

20(1904) 30 Mont. 36, 75 Pac. 524, 527.
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To find an answer to the question of what is the real test, it
is necessary to turn to those intermediate cases where the
husband or wife has some knowledge of the other's infidelity, but
it is not so complete as to compel a finding of belief in guilt.
In an English case, Ellis v. Ellis,21 a husband had been told by a
woman of his wife's adultery. He set up this adultery as a defense
to the wife's suit for maintenance, but did not succeed in proving
it. After the trial he told his wife that he did not believe that she
was guilty, and believed his informant had accused her out of
spite. They then lived together for several weeks, when she left
him. He obtained further evidence of her adultery, and started
divorce proceedings. It was held that her adultery had not been
condoned. In Merrill v. Merrill,22 the defendant had committed
adultery with A's wife. A came to him and accused him in the
presence of the plaintiff. The defendant protested his innocence,
and convinced A that another man was impersonating him. The
plaintiff was satisfied with this explanation too, and believed him
to be innocent. She continued to live with him for three years
and then left him, because her son-in-law showed her a newspaper
clipping referring to his improper relations with Mrs. A and she
then discovered other evidence showing that A's accusations were
well founded when made. It was held that the adultery was not
condoned. In Mischler v. Duchman,23 the husband confronted his
wife with the report of detectives, showing she had committed
adultery. She denied it and convinced him that the charges were
false. It was held that since he accepted her denial as true there
could be no condonation. Many cases involve fact situations
of this same nature and all reach the same conclusion. 24
How do the courts explain these uniformly consistent de2
ci ions? In Ellis v. Ellis it was said, 5
"In order to establish condonation, it is not enough to prove
that the husband took his wife back after certain facts had come
to his knowledge, after certain intelligence had been communicated
-1 (1865) 4 Sw. & Tr. 154.
-"(1899) 41 App. Div. 347, 58 N. Y. S. 503.
23(1925) 159 La. 478. 105 So. 559.
2
4Abbott v. Abbott, (1928) 132 Misc. Rep. 11, 228 N. Y. S. 611;
Harris v. Harris, (1901) 83 App. Div. 123, 82 N. Y. S. 568; Deisler v.
Deisler, (1901) 59 App. Div. 207, 69 N. Y. S. 326; Phillips v. Phillips,
(1930) 221 Ala. 455, 129 So. 3; Greims v. Greims, (1912) 80 N. J. L. 233,
83 Atl. 1001, reversing, (N.J. Ch. 1911) 79 Atl. 1048; Gosser v. Gosser,
(1898) 183 Pa. St. 499, 38 Atl. 1014; Andros v. Andros, (1905) 1 Cal.
App. 309, 82 Pac. 90; Laycock v. Laycock, (1908) 52 Or. 610, 98 Pac. 487;
see: Reading v. Reading, (N.J. Ch. 1887) 8 Atl. 809; Conklin v. Conklin,
(1921) 196 App. Div. 607, 188 N. Y. S. 141, 143.
2 (1865) 4 Sw. & Tr. 154.
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to him tending to prove her adultery; it is necessary to prove that
the husband took his wife back . . . believing her to be guilty.

If the evidence leads the court to the conclusion that the husband
did not thoroughly believe that his wife had been guilty
condonation is not established."
In Merrill v. Merrill the court said :26
"The uniform rule is that some knowledge must exist, sufficiently substantial upon which to base a belief, and usually there
must also be some means of making legal proof of the commission
of the offense, before condonation will be implied from cohabitation. .

.

. The wife instead of being suspicious of the husband

when the charge of infidelity was made against him by Johnson,
was justified in relying upon the denial of her husband. .

.

.She

had no belief in its existence, had no knowledge of the fact, and
had not the slightest proof upon which she might then act."
27
And in Mischler v.Duchman the opinion states,
"Without knowledge on the part of plaintiff of the wrong
conduct of his wife we fail to see in what manner her concealed
faults can be legally condoned. If a husband does not believe
that his wife is guilty when he is so informed, but yields to the
deception practiced upon him by his wife, there can be no legal
basis for reconciliation in such a case."
From these statements it can be seen that although the Ellis case
quite definitely adopts belief as the test, the others speak of
knowledge, or of both belief and knowledge, as being the factor
rendering the cohabitation a condonation. This latter language
is typical of the cases of this factual type, and about all that can
be said for these judicial pronouncements is that they tend to
confuse, rather than clarify, the issue as to whether it is belief
;n guilt that is determinative, or the possession of some quantum
of information.
Can these cases in fact be explained on any other ground than
that belief in guilt is the test? It is true that in them the information possessed is not as full and complete as in the cases heretofore discussed. From that it may be argued that the explanation
of the decisions is that there was not "full knowledge," or that
"knowledge" is not present when information pointing to guilt
is counteracted by the denial of the accused spouse. However,
the principle implicit in all of the cases is that if the injured
26(1899) 41 App. Div. 347, 58 N. Y. S. 503, 505-506. Compare the
language in Greims v. Greims, (1912) 80 N. J. L. 233, 83 At!. 1001, 1003
that "It must be remembered that the petitioner had faith in his wife and
gave full credit to her continued assertions of innocence, and as Malins,
V. C., said in Brown v. Brown, L. R. 7 Eq. 185, 193, 'husbands are apt
to believe what their wives tell them.'"
27(1925) 159 La. 478, 105 So. 559, 560.

KNOWLEDGE OR BELIEF IN CONDONATION

spouse had not been so credulous as to accept the explanations
and in fact had accepted the information as true there would
have been a condonation. In such case the quantum of information or the "knowledge" would have been the same. It is the
acceptance of that information as true, or the discarding of it as
unworthy of belief, in other words the belief in guilt or innocence,
that is controlling. That this is the true ratio decidendi of the
decisions is illustrated by the case of Day v. Day.28 There the
husband received information of his wife's adultery with one
Craft. The wife admitted a number of adulterous acts, but
claimed that they were not voluntary, but the result of force. He
continued to live with her, but left because of a belief in her guilt,
and then returned because of the persuasions of a relative. The
court pointed out that
"If he believed that the numerous acts of adultery brought to
his attention were without her consent, his continuance of the
marital relation might not amount to an effective forgiveness or
condonation. .

.

. Much of his own testimony, however, was

'29
wholly inconsistent with this theory.
In other words the case turned upon whether he believed she was
guilty (which his leaving her and his explanation thereof confirmed) and not upon the state of his knowledge. The same is
true of all the other cases of this type, but in them it appeared
that he in good faith accepted her explanation and believed her to
be innocent.
From an analytical standpoint it is clear that, despite the
judicial language, the motivating principle of all the cases so far
discussed is that belief in guilt is a condition precedent to the
condonation of a marital offense. The term "knowledge" is incapable of being given a precise connotation, whereas "belief," as
applied to these circumstances, does have a definite denotation;
and it was the lack of such belief in guilt that rendered the continued intercourse ineffectual as a bar. It might be well to see
whether that principle is in harmony with the social and moral
precepts which evoked the doctrine of condonation as a defense
to divorce. The doctrine is based upon the principle that society
can not approve of a spouse continuing to enjoy that particular
attribute of married life which alone is condemned unless the
marital status is present, unless this act of itself acts as a factual
and legally conclusive reinstatement of the marital ties. Suppose,

28(1905) 71 Kan. 385, 80 Pac. 974, 6 Ann. Cas. 169.

"0(1905) 71 Kan. 385, 80 Pac. 974, 975.
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then, a spouse has some knowledge of the other's infidelity, either
slight or fairly complete, but not so full and incontrovertible as
to compel belief in guilt, but refuses to believe the other guilty,
either because of the other's denial, or, in the absence of protestations of innocence, because of an implicit faith in the other.
If this spouse, in this state of mind, continues marital cohabitation,
must this conduct meet with disapproval? Can it be said, fairly,
that this man or wife has factually reinstated the marriage and
rendered its judicial termination impossible, when he or she
honestly believed that nothing had ever occurred to terminate that
relationship of mutual trust and faithfulness, or to make its legal
dissolution possible or desirable? Here is not one who intentionally chooses to continue the marital relation despite its breach
by the other, but one who innocently continues it because he
honestly thinks there is no reason to do otherwise. If a spouse
has such faith in the integrity of the other, we can not condemn
him or her for that, nor later bay, "now that it is certain that your
faith was unwarranted you can not put away your unfaithful
partner, because you had 'knowledge' of the adultery and continued
to live with her."
Now suppose that another spouse, with the same knowledge,
slight or extensive, is of a distrustful nature, and therefore accepts
the information or incriminating circumstances as true and believes
the other to be guilty. So believing, he continues marital cohabitation. Is this conduct to be approved? Here is one who
intentionally continues the marriage though he is convinced that
it has been breached and factually terminated. Can it be said to
him, "True enough, you believed your wife was an adulteress and
despite that you were willing to share her charms, but you can
still divorce her because your 'knowledge' of the act was not full
enough at the time to permit of a condonation?" Looking at
the equities of the cases there can be no question that they must
weigh heavily in favor of the former. Yet, if knowledge and not
belief is the test, granting that knowledge must then include
something more than mere lack of ignorance and must be somewhat full (i.e. probable, or reasonable, etc.), the former must be
denied a divorce because he was trusting enough to disbelieve
the somewhat full information which he had, while the latter may
legally cast his wife aside, though he was so lacking in faith that
he believed her an adulteress, and so callous that he continued to
enjoy her charms, because, while doing so, he did not have sufficient knowledge of her guilt.
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It seems clear that, in addition to the practical difficulty of
trying to apply the indefinite term "knowledge" as the test, both
the logical and the sociological approach compel the conclusion
that it is belief and not knowledge that must be the sole test of
condonation. It might be contended that belief is not the sole
test in that knowledge, in its narrow sense, must be present also,
for a spouse who is wholly ignorant of the other's adultery could
not have believed the other to be unfaithful. If the term "knowledge" is so understood and so confined, it might be proper to
say that knowledge plus belief is necessary. However, it would
be much more satisfactory, as an aid to clarity and as a preventative of unfair decisions, if the courts would make a clear avowal
that belief in guilt is the sole condition precedent to condonation.
The question of knowledge would then be relegated to a mere
rule of evidence-that there must have been some information
concerning or circumstances pointing to guilt in the possession
of the plaintiff in order to justify a finding that he believed the
defendant to be guilty."' All of the cases so far discussed have
reached a decision in keeping with the principle that belief is the
test. The criticism is directed not at the actual decisions, but at
the method of approach, which renders obscure a definite underlying principle, and paves the way for an unjust decision in a
particular case, through a reliance upon the terminology rather
than an appreciation of the motivating precept.
3oIt may be said that there is no real difference between a rule to the
effect that there must be knowledge of plus belief in guilt to support a condonation, and a rule to the effect that belief in guilt is the sole prerequisite,
but that, as a matter of evidence, there must have been some knowledge of the
offense to support a finding of belief in guilt. Yet these two different rules
are very apt to produce contrary results when applied, unless the court is
extremely careful to construe knowledge in the proper light. Under the
former rule the court is apt to construe knowledge as meaning that the
plaintiff must have been possessed of a certain quantum of information, and
hence hold, in a particular case, that though the plaintiff in fact believed
his wife to be guilty there was no condonation because he did not have a
sufficient quantum of information to constitute knowledge-the very result
above condemned as being contrary to the motivating social and moral
considerations. On the other hand, if the second rule is applied, the court,
it having been found as a fact that he believed in her guilt, would hold
that there was a condonation, and would not concern itself with the sufficiency or quantity of the information in his possession, other than to see
whether there was evidence showing that he was not wholly ignorant of
the offense.
Even where the statute expressly specifies "knowledge" (see note 2
supra) no particular difficulty is presented. The courts can properly construe the statute as merely being declaratory of the Canon Law (as in
Johnson v. Johnson, (1835) 14 Wend. (N.Y.) 636, 643; Jeans v. Jeans,
(1835) 2 Harr. (Del.) 38; or construe "knowledge" merely as a rule of evidence, or as being used in a particular sense that is synonymous with belief
(which is what the courts have done in fact in numerous cases).
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Strangely, only one case seems squarely to have raised the
issue and expressly discussed whether belief or knowledge is the
real test; and in that one the court said it was inclined to accept
the latter, though it proceeded upon the basis that belief was the
test and found a condonation, since the plaintiff's information was
so complete and irrefutable that lack of belief in guilt was inconceivable. 81 However, a few cases, without mentioning knowledge
as a possible test, have clearly adopted belief as the sole test in
32
condonation cases.
It is evident that in using belief in guilt as the test we must
use the term in the subjective and not in the objective sense.
It is not whether some other person, or the proverbial "reasonable
man," would or would not have believed in guilt, having the same
information that the plaintiff had, but whether in fact this plaintiff
did so believe. For whether the law should approve the particular
spouse's conduct depends, not upon what someone else would
have done under the same circumstances, but upon whether this
spouse's action was prompted by honest and proper motives, or by
a disregard of the decencies of human behavior. This qualification is implicit in the decisions just discussed, though it is seldom
given articulate expression. 8
This much, therefore, seems evident. To rely upon knowledge
as the test, and hence to determine a particular case according to
whether its facts fit into or without a particular contracted or
31

Sneyd v. Sneyd, [1926] P. 27, 95 L. J. P. 22.

in Ellis v. Ellis, quoted above, text at footnote 25. And see:
Anonymous, (1809) 6 Mass. 147, 148, (saying, "But the true import of the
32As

rule, in my opinion, is, that the cohabitation of the husband, after the commission of the offense and after he believes, on probable evidence, the guilt

of his wife, is conclusive evidence of the remission. For he can not be con-

sidered as having impliedly forgiven a crime, which he does not believe
to have been committed."); Reading v. Reading, (N.J. Ch. 1887) 8 Ati.
809; Day v. Day (1905) 71 Kan. 385, 80 Pac. 974, 6 Ann. Cas. 169.
8
"For example, would the average person or a "reasonable man"
have believed the husband's story in Merrill v. Merrill, (1899) 41 App.
Div. 347, 58 N. Y. S. 503? And see Gosser v. Gosser, (1895) 183 Pa. St.
499, 503, 38 Atl. 1014, 1015 (saying, "Much less might have been sufficient

to have convinced others. That he resisted belief, and was slow to act, is
to his credit."); Quincy v. Quincy, (1839) 10 N. H. 272, 279; Keats v.
Keats, (1858) 1 Sw. & Tr. 335, 347. This of course presents a somewhat
more difficult problem of proof than if the objective test were used, but no
more so than in the many other instances in the law where it is necessary
to prove the actual mental state of a person involved, such as the presence

of a specific criminal intent accompanying an act, or the subjective intent
to contract, etc. Of course, in all such matters of proof, the words and
acts of the party and the surrounding circumstances will be of probative

value in determining the actual mental state and, in reality, the fact finding
tribunal will, to some extent, determine what this person in fact intended
or believed by considering what they, or a normal person, would have

believed under the same circumstances.
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expanded penumbra of connotations of the term, is to substitute
an intellectual exercise in etymology for an honest effort to see
that justice is done as a basis for decision. In the cases thus far
discussed a proper decision is likely to be reached despite the
apparent use of this test. The danger is that this test, being
employed in these cases, will be carried over into other situations
and there produce an unjust result. And just this has occurred.
A number of cases have arisen which are like these last considered,
in that one spouse has some information or indication of the
other's adultery, but unlike them, in that there was no accusation
of and denial of guilt by the suspected spouse. In them the
injured spouse may or may not have believed in the other's
guilt, depending upon his or her faith in the other. In a number
of such cases the court has proceeded by making knowledge the
test and then endeavoring to give that term a particular content
for the purpose of application. For example, in Graham v.
Graham,3' marital cohabitation continued after the husband was
told of floating rumors of an affair between his wife and another
man, and after detectives had reported to him that she had gone
to a certain boarding house. In holding there was no condonation,
the court did not mention the presence or absence of belief in
her guilt, simply saying it appeared "that 'reasonable knowledge'
of the infidelity of the defendant, as defined by the authorities,
was not in the possession of the petitioner," and quoting from
an earlier New Jersey case 35 to the effect that
"Reasonable knowledge may be said to have been had when
information of a fact is given by credible persons, speaking of
their own knowledge, particularly if the same facts be afterwards
proved, and they become instrumental in the proof."
A like approach was taken in a case where the husband had
received an anonymous letter telling of his wife's infidelity 8 and
in a few other cases of a similar nature.3 7 For all that appears
34(1892) 50 N. J. Eq. 701, 25 Atl. 358.
35
Marsh v. Marsh, (1861) 13 N. J. Eq. 281, 282 (a case where the
plaintiff at the time of the intercourse was in possession of all the information and evidence subsequently relied upon at the trial to prove the adultery).
3
6Beeler v. Beeler, (1898) 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1936, 44 S. W. 136, 137,
saying, "It must be proven that the injured party, having full knowledge
of the
offense, forgave the offending party."
37
Frost v. Frost, (1916) 85 N. J. Eq. 571, 96 AtI. 1010; see Smith v.
Smith, (1924) 155 La. 647, 99 So. 492, 493; Pain v. Pain, (1889) 37 Mo.
App. 110, 115; cf. Redding v. Redding, (NJ. Ch. 1912) 85 Ati. 712. In
Maglathin v. Maglathin, (1884) 138 Mass. 299, though the language is
rather ambiguous, the court seems to have taken the proper approach; i. e.,
that it was a question of fact for the trial judge as to whether plaintiff
believed the information he had of her guilt. And see: Pepin v. Pepin,
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in these decisions the husband may have believed his wife to be
guilty and yet continued marital cohabitation, but he is not held
accountable because the information which served as a basis for
his belief did not constitute "knowledge" as the court chose to
define that term. This runs counter to the dictates of the pertinent
social and ethical considerations. The cases ignore the underlying
principle of the doctrine of condonation, and illustrate an unfortunate result of the continued use of "knowledge" terminolgy in
the cases. These decisions and this terminology, therefore, are to
be deprecated.
Contrary to the principle that belief in guilt is the test for
condonation, is the statement made in some of the cases to the
effect that there may be no condonation until the innocent spouse
is in possession of sufficient evidence to prove the other's adultery
in court, and, as a subsidiary rule, that even a confession of guilt
by one spouse to the other is not alone a sufficient basis for a
condonation. 8 Thus it is said that
"It is an established rule of law that the husband may not be
held to have condoned an offense of the wife, even though he be
informed by her that she has committed an offense; and this
rule proceeds upon the ground that he may not make use of such
confession as evidence, and, in consequence, he may continue to
cohabit with the wife until possessed of knowledge which will
enable him to legally establish the offense.'39
If such is the rule it is obvious that belief in guilt forms no
basis for a condonation, for no spouse could continue to believe
in the other's innocence after the latter, upon accusation, admitted the adulterous conduct. The cases say that such a rule
(1924) 123 Misc. Rep. 888, 206 N. Y. S.732; Welch v. Welch, (1892) 50
Mo. 38App. 395.
334, 336; Von Funk v. Von Funk,
See Davis v. Davis, (1857) 19 Ill.
(1935) 120 Fla. 103, 162 So. 145; Shackleton v. Shackleton, (1891) 48
N. J.Eq. 364, 366, 21 Atl. 935; Turnbull v. Turnbull, (1861) 23 Ark. 615,
619; Hofmire v. Hofmire, (1838) 7 Paige Ch. (N.Y.) 60, 32 Am. Dec. 611,
612; Uhlmann v. Uhlmann, (1885) 17 Abb. N. C. (N.Y.) 236; Deisler v.
Deisler, (1901) 59 App. Div. 207, 69 N. Y. S.326, 332-333; but cf. Pepin
v. Pepin, (1924) 123 Misc. Rep. 888, 206 N. Y. S.732.
39Merrill v. Merrill, (1899) 41 App. Div. 347, 58 N. Y. S. 503, 505.
The statement that he can not make use of such confession as evidence is
incorrect. With the exception of three jurisdictions, where unusual statutory
provisions are controlling (Richardson v. Richardson, (1837) 4 Port. (Ala.)
467, 30 Am. Dec. 538; Hampton v. Hampton, (1890) 87 Va. 148, 12
S. E. 340; Trough v. Trough, (1906) 59 W. Va. 464, 53 S.E. 630, 115 Am.
St. Rep. 940, 4 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1185, 8 Ann. Cas. 837) it is consistently
held that the admissions or confessions of a spouse are admissible in evidence to prove the commission of a marital offense. See 4 Wigmore,
Treatise on Evidence, 2nd ed., sec. 2069. A question arises only as to
whether the confession is sufficient proof if uncorroborated by other evidence. See note 45, infra.
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is necessary, in that if a husband left his wife because he was
convinced that she had committed adultery, but he did not have
sufficient evidence to prove the charge in court, he would be
guilty of desertion 4" and, further, that if he did not continue
cohabitation it would frustate the means of discovery ;4 or, that
it. is advisable because the husband should not expose his wife
and family to disgrace, by leaving her and applying for a divorce,
until he is certain that he can prove the adultery. 42 It is submitted
that these cases are based upon a misconception of what constitutes
condonation. It may well be that a husband should not leave his
wife and commence divorce proceedings until he is satisfied that
he can prove his case, but it is not the failure to start proceedings,
nor the continuing to live under the same roof, which constitutes
condonation, but marital intercourse.4 3 Where the husband, because of information obtained or because of her own confession,
believes his wife to be guilty, he may hesitate to leave her or to
file his petition until he is certain he can prove it, but he can not
justifiably continue marital intercourse and then cast her aside
when sufficient proof is forthcoming. 44 This alleged general rule
42
and its subsidiary rule as to confession of guilt is hence without

any valid foundation, either in law or for reasons of policy. In
fact no case has actually held that marital intercourse subsequent
to either a confession of guilt, or to a belief in guilt otherwise
4
oSee Hofmire v. Hofmire, (1838) 7 Paige Ch. (N.Y.) 60, 32 Am. Dec.
611; 2 Bishop, Marriage and Divorce, 6th ed., 1881, sec. 43, n. 9.
41
See Elwes v. Elwes, (1796) 1 Hagg. Con. 269, 292; but see Dillon
(1842) 3 Curt. 86, 91, 6 Jur. 422.
v. Dillon,
42
See Ellis v. Ellis, (N.J. 1887) 9 Atl. 884, 886.
43Though husband and wife continue to live in the same house, and
even share the same room, there is no condonation unless they had sexual

intercourse. Marshall v. Marshall, (1925) 55 App. D. C. 173, 3 Fed. (2d)

344, 40 A. L. R. 624; Greenwell v. Greenwell, (R.I. 1916) 98 Atl. 53Harnett v. Harnett, (1882) 59 Iowa 401, 13 N. W. 408; Koch v. Koch, (1916)
62 Pa. Super. 607.
"4"Where a husband has received information respecting his wife's
guilt, and can place such reliance on the truth of it as to act on it, although he is not bound to remove his wife out of his house, he ought to
cease marital cohabitation with her." Dillon v. Dillon, (1842) 3 Curt. 86,
91, 64 Jur. 422.
5This subsidiary rule has a further fundamental weakness in that the
better, though minority, rule is that a confession of guilt, alone and uncorroborated, is sufficient evidence to prove adultery in divorce proceedings, provided the confession was free from collusion. Robinson v. Robinson, (1859) 1 Sw. & Tr. 767; Getty v. Getty, [1907] P. 334; Billings v.
Billings, (1831) 11 Pick. (Mass.) 461; Stewart v. Stewart, (1921) 93
N. J. Eq. 1, 114 Atl. 851; see 4 Wigmore, Evidence 2d. ed., secs. 2067,
2068. And, of course, in the cases before us, it must be assumed that the
confession was real and non-collusive; for, otherwise, it could have formed
no basis for a belief in guilt.
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induced, did not constitute a condonation" and there is consider4
able judicial language contrary to that of these cases. 1
One further problem, falling within our general topic, deserves
comment. A situation of the following nature is occasionally
presented for decision. A husband receives information of, or
his wife confesses to, a specific act or specific acts of adultery.
The husband believes that such adultery took place and, being
ignorant of any other transgressions by her, believes that her
infidelity was confined to this one act, or these particular acts.
So believing, he continues marital cohabitation. Thereafter he
learns that in addition to this act or these adulteries, his wife has
been guilty of other adulterous conduct. He thereupon leaves
her. The question then is presented as to whether his continued
cohabitation acted as a condonation of all her past adultery, or
only of such acts as he was then aware of and believed in. Here
the underlying policy and the equities of the case would seem
to support the latter conclusion. A spouse who is aware only of
the fact that the other has strayed from the straight and narrow
path on one occasion, or with but one man, may be willing to
forego his remedy and continue the marriage, or may not be so
injured thereby that further marital intercourse would be unthinkable; but it would oppugn human nature to assume that this
spouse would have felt the same way had he been aware of and
convinced that she had been guilty of these other infidelities. To
choose between a divorce from and a continuation of the marriage
with a wife who has been guilty of a single misstep and to choose
between a divorce from or a continuation of the marriage with a
wife who has been a promiscuous offender, are two entirely different things; and, in fairness, the injured spouse is entitled to
know the exact nature of the choice which he must make before
it can be made binding upon him. The cases in which a situation
of this nature has arisen have followed this line of reasoning,
and hold that the condonation is confined to the acts which the
injured spouse believed to have been committed, and that a divorce
"Except, possibly, Von Funk v. Von Funk, (1935) 120 Fla. 103, 162
So. 145; although the language used to the effect that "a husband can't be
said to have condoned the offense . . .where he continues to give her the
benefit of the doubt," indicates that the reason for the decision was that he
did not believe her to be guilty.
47Timmings v. Timmings, (1792) 3 Hagg. Ecc. 76, 77; Dillon v.
Dillon, (1842) 3 Curt. 86; Quincy v. Quincy, (1839) 10 N. H. 272, 275, 277;
Farmer v. Farmer, (1889) 86 Ala. 322, 5 So. 434, 435; Spence v. Spence,
(1926) 162 La. 1, 110 So. 68.
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will be granted for the adultery of which he or she remained
ignorant at the time of the cohabitation.

48

It should be observed, however, that the information and consequent belief may be such, in a particular case, that the intercourse should be construed as a condonation of all offenses,
including those of which the plaintiff was not even aware. In the
above cases the plaintiff was aware of but one act of adultery
and subsequently learned of another act; or was aware of adultery
with one person and later learned that the husband or wife had
been living a life of profligacy or prostitution. A different situation would be presented where the spouse had reason to and
did believe that the other had committed numerous, indiscriminate
transgressions and yet continued cohabitation. There, it could
not be contended reasonably that the plaintiff's conduct would have
been different had he or she been aware of a few additional acts,
and it follows that such conduct should preclude the granting of
a divorce. This principle has been applied in cases where, upon
accusation of adultery, the guilty spouse makes a general confession of guilt, no specific acts being charged or admitted. There,
subsequent cohabitation condones all adultery, though the injured
spouse may later learn of specific instances of adultery of which
49
he or she was not aware at the time of the marital cohabitation.
The applicable principle is well stated in Moorhouse v. Moorhouse :50
"It is doubtless true that the act of condonation only operates
to forgive the specific acts condoned, when the forgiveness is
applied to specific acts ....

But where no specific acts or offense

are known or disclosed, and where no inquiry is made as to
specific acts and there is no concealment or denial upon inquiry,
but the confession is of general infidelity, without specification,
then a condonation, also general, applies as well to one precedent
offense as to another, and includes them all."
Somewhere between these two situations the line must be drawn
and the determinative test will be whether the plaintiff's conduct
would have been any different had he been aware of and believed
that all of the acts of adultery took place which in fact did occur.
48
Alexandre v. Alexandre, (1870) L. R. 2 Prob. & Div. 164; Frank v.
Frank, (1930) 99 Pa. Super. 183; Shackleton v. Shackleton, (1891) 48
N. J. Eq. 364, 21 At]. 935, 27 An. St. Rep. 478; see Durant v. Durant, (1825)

1 Hagg. Ecc. 733, 752; but see Fowler v. Fowler, (1926) 119 Okl. 95, 248
Pac. 629,
632.
9
4 Rogers v. Rogers, (1877)
(1899) 90 Ill. App. 401.

122 Mass. 423; Moorhouse v. Moorhouse,

1;0(1899) 90 III. App. 401, 403.

